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In  Ethical Consistency, Bernard Williams vindicated the possibility of moral conflicts; he proposed to consistently allow for
the presence of such conflicts within the logic of ought. In determining the nature of moral conflict, Williams stressed its
contingency. In this paper, Williams’ characterization of moral conflict is defended. However, Williams’ solution for
consistently allowing for such conflicts within the logic of ought is shown to be too crude. Whereas Williams rejects all
applications of the agglomeration rule in the logic of ought, it is shown that a more sophisticated approach is needed. An
alternative solution is presented in which the application of the agglomeration rule is made conditional upon the principle that
"ought implies can."
1. Introduction
In Ethical Consistency (Williams, 1965),
Bernard Williams discussed the nature of moral conflict
and suggested a way to modify the logic of ought so that
it allows for a consistent treatment of moral conflicts.[1]
In this paper, I want to (i) draw attention to Williams’
characterization of moral conflict, and (ii) make some
suggestions for a more sophisticated logic of ought in line
with the general ideas presented in Ethical Consistency.
I will introduce Williams’ delineation of moral
conflict in Section 2, and relate it to the importance of
consistency in ethics in Section 3. In Section 4, I critically
discuss Williams’ solution for making the logic of ought
tolerant with respect to moral conflicts. The problems
with this solution lead me to propose and defend a more
refined alternative in Section 5. In Section 6 I return to
Williams’ general characterization of moral conflict, and
defend some assumptions that were accepted implicitly
throughout the paper.
2. Williams’ characterization of moral conflict
Williams takes a moral conflict to be a conflict
between two moral judgments that someone is disposed
to make relevant to deciding what to do. He only focuses
on conflicts of obligations, i.e. "purely" moral conflicts,
and not on, for instance, conflicts between a moral
judgment and a non-moral desire or belief. Like most
authors writing on moral conflicts, Williams discusses
this topic in terms of ought, "not because ought
necessarily figures in the expression of every moral
conflict … but because it presents the most puzzling
problems" (Williams, 1965, p. 108). Williams further
confines his subject to moral conflicts with a contingent
basis, thereby excluding from his discussion the
possibility that someone holds moral views or principles
that are intrinsically inconsistent, i.e. logically
incompatible with one another. According to Williams,
the basis of moral conflicts is contingent in the sense that
it is the world, not logic, that makes it impossible for both
conflicting obligations to be satisfied; we can consistently
imagine a state of affairs in which they could both be
satisfied, but the present factual situation makes it
impossible to do so. Williams’ concern lies only with
conflicts that have a contingent basis, with conflict via the
facts, and not with conflicts between logically
incompatible obligations:
 I shall further omit any discussion of the
possibility (if it exists) that a man should hold
moral principles or general moral views which
are intrinsically inconsistent with one another, in
the sense that there could be no conceivable
world in which anyone could act in accordance
with both of them; as might be the case, for
instance, with a man who thought that he ought
not to go in for any blood-sport (as such) and
that he ought to go in for foxhunting (as such). I
doubt whether there are any interesting questions
that are peculiar to this possibility. (Williams,
1965, p. 108)
Whenever two obligations conflict, a situation can always
be conceived in which the very same obligations can be
consistently satisfied. Moral conflicts between logically
incompatible obligations,  if they exist at all, are at best
uninteresting.
Understood in this way, moral conflicts can take
two basic forms: "One is that in which it seems that I
ought to do each of two things, but I cannot do both. The
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other is that in which something which (it seems) I ought
to do in respect of certain of its features also has other
features in respect of which (it seems) I ought not do it"
(Williams, 1965, p. 108).
The two basic forms come to this: "in the first,
it seems that I ought to do a and that I ought to do b, but
I cannot do both a and b; in the second, it seems that I
ought to do c and that I ought not to do c" (Williams,
1965, p.109). I will henceforth refer to these as type 1-
and type 2-conflicts. The following examples illustrate
the distinction Williams has in mind:
Example 1 (Conflict of type 1). Suppose that
Mary promised to friend X that she will meet her
today at 7pm in front of the local airport.
However, Mary also promised to friend Y that
she will meet him today at 7pm at the gym.
Suppose further that there is a considerable
distance between the airport and the gym. Then,
in view of the consideration that promises should
be kept,  Mary ought to be at the airport at 7pm
to meet X and Mary ought to be at the gym at
7pm to meet Y, but she cannot fulfill both of
these obligations.
Example 2 (Conflict of type 2). Agamemnon is
told by a seer that he must sacrifice his daughter
to satisfy a goddess who is delaying at Aulis his
expedition against Troy. As a commander,
Agamemnon ought to sacrifice his daughter in
order to further the expedition. However, as a
father, Agamemnon ought not to kill his
daughter.
Every type 2-conflict has the logical form of an
inconsistency of the type "ought-ought not." For instance,
in Example 2 Agamemnon both ought to kill his daughter
and ought not to kill his daughter. However, this
characterization of type 2-conflicts conceals the real roots
of the conflict, namely the fact that the conflict arises
from a contingent impossibility. According to Williams,
the recognition that type 2-conflicts have contingent roots
motivates the reconstruction of type 2-conflicts as type 1-
conflicts. 
In the case of Agamemnon, the roots of the
conflict are exposed by acknowledging that the conflict
arises from the contingent incompatibility of
Agamemnon’s duties as a commander, respectively as a
parent. Given this acknowledgment, Williams believes we
can recast Agamemnon’s dilemma as a type 1-conflict:
that, "here again there is a double ought: the first, to
further the expedition, the second, to refrain from the
killing; and that as things are he [Agamemnon] cannot
discharge both" (Williams, 1965, p. 119). Seen in this
way, the real roots of type 2-conflicts are no longer
concealed, and a more realistic picture is offered of how
the situation is. As an upshot, moral conflicts need no
longer wear the form of an inconsistency of the type
"ought-ought not."
3. Morality,  consistency, and logic
According to Williams, all moral conflicts are,
ultimately, of type 1. Moral conflicts are of the following
form:
(i) It ought to be that a,
(ii) It ought to be that b,
(iii) It cannot be that a and b.
At first sight, this form provides a consistent
characterization of moral conflict. Suppose now that we
accept the agglomeration principle, according to which
"it ought to be that a" and "it ought to be that b" together
imply "it ought to be that a and b." Then it follows from
(i) and (ii) that:
(iv) It ought to be that a and b.
If, moreover, we accept that "ought implies can," then
from (iii) it follows that (by "ought implies can" and
contraposition):
(v) It is not the case that it ought to be that a and b.
(iv) and (v) are contradictories: they form an
inconsistency of the type "ought-not ought." This
observation prompts the following questions:
(a) Should we prevent contradictions from arising in our ethical
theories?
(b) If so, then how exactly should the derivation of (iv) or (v) be
blocked?
In the remainder of this section, I will argue that question
(a) requires a positive answer. In Section 4, I will
critically discuss Williams’ answer to question (b).
Morality is firmly tied to consistency. If
someone were to issue the inconsistent command to both
close and not close the door, we would be at loss as to
how to act. If ethics is to provide us with a guide for
morality, then it should be free of contradictions. Ethicists
should be rational, and rationality seems to presuppose
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consistency: "How do you respond to someone who
denies the law of non-contradiction? Some logicians
suggest hitting the person with a stick. A better idea is to
pretend to agree: whenever you assert something, also
assert the opposite. Soon your opponent will want to hit
you with a stick!" (Gensler, 1996, p. 36). According to
Gensler, a tolerable life requires a large degree of
consistency, since inconsistency has harmful
consequences and is inherently distressing. In assisting us
in behaving in a morally consistent way, I agree with
Gensler that formal logic can be a very useful tool. Logic
can help us clarify, understand, and evaluate: "Logic can
help us understand our moral reasoning – how we go
from premises to a conclusion. It can force us to clarify
and spell out our presuppositions, to understand
conflicting points of view, and to identify weak points in
our reasoning. Logic is a useful discipline to sharpen our
ethical thinking" (Gensler, 1996, p. 38). 
The branch of formal logic that studies, amongst
others, the normative concept of obligation, is called
deontic logic. Logicians in this field usually abbreviate a
sentence like "it ought to be that A" by a formula OA,
where "O" is a logical operator representing obligation.
If, moreover, we take "" to be a logical operator for
representing possibility, we can formalize a moral conflict
as characterized by Bernard Williams as a formula (OA &
OB) & ¬(A & B). OA abbreviates the obligation to do A,
OB abbreviates the obligation to do B, and ¬(A & B)
abbreviates the impossibility to do both A and B. 
Deontic logic provides us with some extra tools
in trying to keep our ethical theories free from
contradictions. In the next section, I will use some
insights relying on deontic logic in order to point at some
problems with Williams’ solution for keeping our moral
theories free from inconsistencies.
4. Williams’ solution
If we want to avoid the derivation of a
contradiction from Williams’ account of moral conflict in
terms of (i)-(iii), then either the application of the
agglomeration principle or the application of "ought
implies can" needs to be rejected or at least restricted.
According to Williams, the application of "ought implies
can" in this derivation is valid, but that of agglomeration
is not:
for no agent, conscious of the situation of
conflict, in fact thinks that he ought to do both
of the things. What he thinks is that he ought to
do each of them; and this is properly paralleled
at the level of ‘can’ by the fact that while he
cannot do both of the things, it is true of each of
the things, taken separately, that he can do it.
(Williams, 1965, p. 120, emphasis in original)
Williams’ solution for avoiding the derivability of
inconsistencies from a moral conflict consists in giving
up the agglomeration principle. Although he does not
claim to have a knock-down disproof of this principle, he
talks of abandoning (Williams, 1965, p. 120), waiving (p.
122), and rejecting (p. 123) agglomeration in order to
obtain a more realistic picture of moral thought. Logicians
too have proposed giving up the agglomeration principle
in order to make deontic logic conflict-tolerant (e.g., van
Fraassen, 1973; Goble, 2000; Schotch & Jennings, 1981).
However, there are some problems with this approach.
Throughout this section and the next, I will
assume that (i)-(iii) adequately captures the structure of
moral conflict, and that "ought implies can" is a valid
principle of moral thought. In section 6, I will come back
to these points. 
Even if Williams is correct in claiming that "no
agent, conscious of the situation of conflict, in fact thinks
that he ought to do both of the things," I believe that the
same agent will reason very differently in case the
ought’s in question do not conflict. Consider, for
instance, a slightly modified version of Example 1 above,
in which Mary promised to friend X that she will meet her
today at 10pm in front of the local airport, and promised
to friend Y that she will meet him today at 7pm at the
gym. Suppose further that it is perfectly possible for Mary
to meet Y at the gym at 7pm and to meet X at the airport
at 10pm. Then there is nothing that prevents her from
concluding that she ought to meet both X and Y today. In
this modified version of Example 1, the application of the
agglomeration principle is both natural and intuitive. 
Not only can we find situations in which the
application of the agglomeration principle is intuitive, we
can even find situations in which we need to apply it in
order to adequately capture our everyday moral reasoning.
Consider the following example from (Horty, 2003):
Example 3. Suppose that, according to the laws
of his country, Smith ought to fight in the army
or perform alternative service to his country.
Suppose further that, since he is a pacifist, Smith
ought not to fight in the army. Then, in the
absence of any extra information, we want to
conclude that Smith ought to perform alternative
service to his country.
In order to see why agglomeration is necessary in
Example 3 in order to attain the conclusion, we need to
formalize the example in the language of deontic logic.
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Let O(F v S) abbreviate Smith’s obligation to fight in the
army (F) or perform alternative service to his country (S),
and let O¬F abbreviate Smith’s obligation not to fight in
the army. In deontic logic, the agglomeration rule comes
down to:
If OA and OB, then O(A & B)
In order to arrive at the conclusion that Smith ought to
perform alternative service to his country, we will also
need the inheritance rule ("|" denotes theorem-hood in
classical logic, "e" denotes classical implication):
If | A e B, then  | OA e OB
In a normal system of deontic logic, the inference from
O(F v S) and O¬F to OS would go as follows:
(1) O(F v S) hypothesis
(2) O¬F hypothesis
(3) O((F v S) & ¬F) 1,2; agglomeration
(4) |  ((F v S) & ¬F) e S theorem of classical logic
(5)|  O((F v S) & ¬F) e OS 4; inheritance
(6)OS 3,5; modus ponens
The theorem stated at line 4 is an instance of the
classically valid disjunctive syllogism rule, which states
that if both (A or B) and ¬A are true, then so is B. 
If now, as Williams suggests, we reject the
application of agglomeration at line 3 of the proof, then
OS is no longer derivable. Since there is no other way to
obtain OS via the theorems and rules of standard deontic
logic, this observation can be generalized: Example 3
cannot be accounted for by any system of deontic logic
that rejects the agglomeration principle. 
In abandoning the agglomeration principle,
Williams took care that his account of moral conflict
remains consistent. The result, however, is a theory that
is too weak to mirror our everyday normative reasoning.
It seems, then, that instead of rejecting agglomeration in
its entirety, we should somehow distinguish between
valid and invalid applications of this rule and throw away
only the invalid ones: "Apparently, what is needed is
some degree of agglomeration, but not too much; and the
problem of formulating a principle allowing for exactly
the right amount of agglomeration raises delicate issues
that have generally been ignored in the literature, which
seems to contain only arguments favoring either
wholesale acceptance or wholesale rejection" (Horty,
2003, p. 580).
5. An alternative proposal
What we are aiming for is an account of moral
conflict that (a) avoids the derivability of a contradiction
from a moral conflict, and (b) allows the application of
agglomeration in cases where we would expect it to. In
validating both "ought implies can" and the
agglomeration rule we cannot meet demand (a), whereas
a logic that simply rejects agglomeration cannot meet
demand (b). Hence we will need something more
sophisticated.
Consider again the modified version of Example
1 as presented in the previous section. Let OX abbreviate
Mary’s obligation to meet X at 10pm in front of the
airport, and let OY abbreviate Mary’s obligation to meet
Y at 7pm at the gym. The reason why in this particular
case we expect the obligation O(X & Y) to be derivable is
that it is possible for Mary to meet Y at the gym at 7pm
and to meet X at the airport at 10pm, i.e. (X & Y). 
We can now generalize this observation: when
faced with two obligations, we can distinguish between
valid and invalid applications of agglomeration by asking
ourselves whether or not it is possible for an agent to
fulfill both obligations. If so, then conjoining both
obligations is unproblematic. This suggests the following
restriction on the principle of agglomeration, which I will
call -agglomeration:
If OA and OB, then (A & B) implies O(A & B)
-agglomeration gives priority to "ought implies can"
over agglomeration whenever we face a moral conflict:
whenever it is impossible to do two things each of which
you ought to do, the inference to the obligation to do both
things is blocked. 
In case of a conflict of the form OA, OB, ¬(A
& B), it is easily seen why -agglomeration will not allow
us to derive O(A & B): in order to apply -agglomeration
here, we would need (A & B), a formula that is
explicitly negated in our premise set.
I believe the rule of -agglomeration to be in the
spirit of Bernard Williams’ thoughts on the subject. In
Ethical Consistency, Williams states on more than one
occasion that the roots of moral conflicts are contingent:
conflicting obligations arise through the practical
impossibility of their mutual fulfillment. In making
agglomeration conditional upon "ought implies can,"
Williams’ original arguments for rejecting agglomeration
remain intact: -agglomeration does not allow us to
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aggregate conflicting obligations. However, the problems
faced by Williams’ solution are dispensed with. In those
circumstances in which the application of agglomeration
is natural and unproblematic,  -agglomeration permits
the aggregation of non-conflicting obligations.
Usually, deontic logicians take formulas of the
form OA & O¬A as the paradigmatic formalization of
moral conflicts. If, as Williams informally suggests, we
instead take moral conflicts to be
formulas of the form OA & OB & ¬(A
& B), and if we replace the agglomeration
rule with the -agglomeration rule, then
we obtain a new class of systems of
deontic logic that is definitely worth further investigation.
In fact, these systems might be able to avoid the problems
mentioned in (Goble, 2005) concerning formal
restrictions of the agglomeration rule in order to allow for
the accommodation of moral conflicts in deontic logic.
However, the detailed description of the axioms of such
systems is left for future exploration. As with any
informal description of a system of formal logic, other
problems and technical questions might pop up, none of
which need concern us here.
6. A defense of Williams’ general strategy
Throughout sections 4 and 5, I have assumed the
validity of Williams’ characterization of moral conflict
and of "ought implies can." In this section, I will defend
these assumptions one by one. 
6.1. The structure and formalization of moral conflict
At the core of Williams’ characterization of
moral conflict lies the claim that all such conflicts have a
contingent basis. Moral conflicts can arise between
incompatible, but not between inherently inconsistent
obligations. Given this claim, Williams recasts all type 2-
conflicts as type 1-conflicts. 
The example used by Williams in order to
illustrate this assimilation of conflict-types is that of
Agamemnon. There is a sense in which Agamemnon both
ought to kill his daughter and ought not to kill his
daughter, but this characterization hides the real roots of
the conflict. Ultimately, the conflict arises from
Agamemnon’s incapability of fulfilling his obligations as
a commander on the one hand, and as a father on the
other. 
There is no possible world in which we can
imagine Agamemnon to both kill and not kill his
daughter. Both obligations are logically incompatible.
However, there are possible worlds in which we can
imagine Agamemnon satisfying his duties as a father as
well as his duties as a commander. One such possible
world could be a world in which no goddess is delaying
Agamemnon’s expedition. 
In general, the reformulation of type 2-conflicts
as type 1-conflicts reveals the contingent roots of moral
conflicts. But is such a reformulation always possible?
Can all type 2-conflicts be recast as type 1-conflicts? A
counter-example against this reformulation would consist
of a situation in which someone ought to do A and ought
to do ¬A, and in which there are no distinguishable moral
considerations B and C in view of which she ought to A,
respectively ¬A.
It seems to me that any such conflict could only
arise from a moral guide or theory that itself contains
explicit inconsistencies, e.g. when an authority or a body
of law tells us to do A and also tells us to do ¬A without
specifying any further considerations in view of which
these obligations arise. With Williams, I agree that it is
highly doubtful that there is anything morally interesting
to say about such situations. With Gensler, I agree that
morality requires a large degree of consistency. 
6.2. "ought implies can"
Suppose that we accept Williams’
characterization of moral conflict, and that we want to
prevent moral conflicts from causing our theories to
contain inconsistencies. Then we still need not agree that
the agglomeration rule has to be rejected or at least
restricted. Another valid option open to us is to deny that
"ought implies can"
In Ethical Consistency, Williams is very brief in his
discussion of this principle:
Now much could be said about ‘ought’ implies
‘can’ … but I shall forgo any general discussion
of it. I shall accept, in fact, one of its main
applications to this problem, namely that from
the fact that I cannot do both A and B it follows
contrapositively that it is not the case that I
ought to do both A and B. (Williams, 1965, p.
120)
Let us take a look at two examples against "ought implies
can" as found in (Sinnott-Armstrong, 1984). First,
consider the sentence "Jones ought to jump over the
moon." There is nothing in our everyday discourse that
prevents us from uttering this statement. If we accept that
"ought implies can," then from Jones’ obligation to jump
over the moon it follows that Jones can jump over the
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moon, which is nonsense. Hence, opponents claim, ought
does not imply can.
Second, imagine a situation in which someone
can escape having to do something simply by making
himself unable to do it. Suppose, for instance, that Adams
ought to meet Brown in a given bar at 5 p.m. Moreover,
Adams knows that if he does not leave work before 4:30
p.m., he will not be able to meet Brown at 5 p.m.
However, at 4:30 p.m. Adams decides to stay at work.
Past this moment, Adams can no longer meet Brown at 5
p.m. Hence, by "ought implies can" and contraposition,
he ought no longer meet Brown at 5 p.m.
Should we conclude from these examples that
ought does not imply can? I believe we should not.
Reconsider "Jones ought to jump over the moon." Since
Jones cannot jump over the moon, it follows, according
to Williams, that it is not the case that Jones ought to
jump over the moon. Moral thought, like any thought,
aims at consistency and coherence. That we can express
sentences like "Jones ought to jump over the moon" does
not necessarily imply that they bear any moral
significance, or "that any morally interesting questions are
peculiar to their possibility." The ought’s uttered in such
sentences need not have any moral force. It is my
conviction that no rational guide to morality would ever
issue an obligation to jump over the moon.
Similarly, an agent who consciously makes
herself unable to fulfill a moral obligation is not behaving
in the (rational) way that is presupposed by morality.
Again, it is doubtful that anything morally relevant can be
said about such an agent. People making themselves
unable to do what is morally required could be responded
to in a fashion remembering of Gensler’s response to
someone denying all instances of the law of non-
contradiction; if, whenever we are facing a moral
obligation, we were to consciously place ourselves in a
situation in which we are unable to fulfill the obligation,
no obligation at all would ever need to be fulfilled, and
morality itself would be rendered vacuous. 
 Of course, this defense of "ought implies can" is
in no way definitive. Many more arguments can be, and
have been, given for and against this principle, and it is
not my aim here to discuss all of them. I merely want to
illustrate that it makes sense to uphold and defend "ought
implies can" if we accept Williams’ ideas on ethical
consistency.
7. Conclusion
Williams aimed at drawing a picture of moral
thought that is both realistic and free from contradiction.
One of the key insights expressed in Ethical Consistency
is that the nature of moral conflict is contingent. Moral
conflicts are not inherently inconsistent; conflicts arise
via the facts.
However, conjoined with the agglomeration rule
and "ought implies can," moral conflicts as conceived by
Williams do cause inconsistency. Hence if Williams’
account of moral conflict is to remain consistent, one of
these rules must be restricted or given up. I have defended
Williams’ characterization of moral conflict as well as the
principle that "ought implies can." With Williams, I have
agreed that the principle of agglomeration is the real
culprit here.
Against Williams, however, I have claimed that
agglomeration should not be rejected in its entirety. A
realistic picture of moral thought requires us to accept the
agglomeration rule on the condition that both obligations
to be aggregated can be jointly fulfilled. The resulting
restricted agglomeration rule, called -agglomeration,
leaves intact Williams’ original arguments against
agglomeration. At the same time, it leaves us with a logic
of ought that is sufficiently rich in order to account for
our everyday normative reasoning. My arguments against
the wholesale rejection of agglomeration rely on insights
from the field of deontic logic. The concrete technical
stipulation of a system of deontic logic that replaces
agglomeration with -agglomeration is an interesting
project that is left for future research.
Notes
1. Ethical Consistency was first published in 1965, and was later reprinted in (Williams, 1973), (Gowans, 1987), and (Sayre-McCord, 1988). Here,
page references to Ethical Consistency refer to the original version (Williams, 1965).
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